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INTRODUCTION
RICHARD ELDRIDGE
I said, “we were not stocks and stones”—’tis very well. I should 
have added, nor are we angels, I wish we were,—hut men 
cloathed with bodies, and governed by our imaginations;— 
and what a junketing piece of work of it there is, betwixt 
these and our seven senses__
For my hobby-horse, if you recollect a little, is no way 
a vicious beast; he has scarce one hair or lineament of the 
ass about him—’Tis the sporting little filly-folly which 
carries you out for the present hour—a maggot, a butterfly 
a picture, a fiddle-stick—an uncle Toby’s siege—or an any 
thing, which a man makes a shift to get a stride on, to cater 
it away from the cares and solicitudes of life—’tis as useful a 
beast as is in the whole creation—nor do I really see how the 
world could do without it.
—Laurence Sterne, The Life and Opinions 
of Tristram Shandy, Gentleman
As these two epigraphs from Tristram Shandy eloquently indicate, human beings 
are complicated animals who are freighted with imaginations that range beyond 
the senses; they use their imaginations both to escape from life and to find lines of 
direction and interest within it. Certain exercises of imagination can seem fruit­
less and strange, yet also compelling and necessary for forming and maintaining 
substantial commitments.
Both literature (both its production and the critical study of it) and philosophy 
as disciplines have often been seen (sometimes by each other) as embodying either
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Strange fruitlessness or compelling necessity—sometimes both. As early as Plato’s 
Ion, literary works and their authors were cast as divinely inspired, but wayward, 
uninformed by craft, and useless for the serious business of life. As early as Aristo­
phanes’ Clouds, philosophy is seen as comically pretentious and ridiculous. With 
the steady separation of modern science from natural philosophy since the seven­
teenth century, this impression of philosophy as comical has only widened.
Both literary writers (along with many of those who study them) and phi­
losophers (and those who study them) have long insisted, with considerable force, 
that they are attending seriously to life, not escaping from it. Whatever their wild 
varieties of form, the texts that are produced by philosophical and literary writ­
ers differ significantly from mere lists of otherwise unassociated words and from 
sonic word play alone. Some forms of attention and discipline seem to control 
both philosophical and literary production, even while imagination (beyond 
sensation, measurement, and calculation) remains central, while which forms of 
discipline and why and how they control production remain unclear and deeply 
contested.
In contrast with the focus on material actualities that is typical of the natural 
sciences (however mediated that focus is by imagination), philosophy and litera­
ture as forms of attention focus more on human commitments and passions. At its 
most abstract and general, philosophy undertakes to specify ideal commitments, 
or the commitments that it would be most effectively worthwhile to have, even if 
their fulfillments remain contingent and interruptible. The effort is, inter alia, to 
specify justice as an ideal form of social life, or morality as an ideal form of personal 
and immediate interpersonal comportment, or a practice of inquiry as an ideal 
form of cognitive engagement with the real, or ideal success in formal arrange­
ment. Yet any such effort at least runs a risk of being fantastically ad hoc and empty 
in relation to empirical details of present material circumstance that remain, in 
part, hindrances not so easily assimilated to pursuits of the ideal. Tyrannical, sec­
tarian domination may in turn result from attempting to put fantastic ideals into 
actual practice. Hence, close attention to material circumstances and passions for 
their own sakes seems necessary to correct abstract ideal theorizing that is always 
possibly premature. Philosophy seems to need correction by literature’s attention 
to how any commitments might in particular be lived, if it is to avoid comic irrel­
evance and the rationalization of domination.
Literature, in contrast, focuses on the particular in the universal, undertak­
ing to track what is most likely to come, tragically or comically, of the bearing of 
particular passions in circumstances that remain always in part intractable. This 
literary form of attention runs the risk, however, of seeing human beings as caught 
up only and always in pieces of good or bad luck, failing to discern any genuine 
universals that human beings might well pursue. Human life may be presented 
as one damn thing after another, without any clear possibilities either of fruitful 
emplotment or of evident connections among distinct human lives. Unilluminat­
ing particularism is as least a possible fate of close attention to material circum­
stances and passions, a possible fate that it becomes increasingly difficult to avoid
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in the wake of the modern disenchantment of nature. Samuel Beckett, for example, 
favors a form of literature that consists in “the expression that there is nothing to 
express, nothing with which to express, nothing from which to express, no power 
to express, no desire to express, together with the obligation to express” (1965:13). 
If that is what literature in the end amounts to, then it will be impossible to define, 
even provisionally and gesturally, and it will become instead a thing of refusals of 
meaning and resistances to it. As Jacques Derrida puts it, “It’s the most interesting 
thing in the world, maybe even more interesting than the world, and this is why, 
if it has no definition, what is heralded and refused under the name of literature 
cannot be identified with any other discourse. It will never be scientific, philo­
sophical, conversational” (1992; 47). Yet if it affords only stuttering, without gen- 
eralizable meaning of any kind, then the point of the literary work is desperately 
unclear, however subjectively important it is felt to be by certain isolated intellec­
tuals. Hence, literature seems to need correction by philosophy’s efforts to trace 
universals and to discern and specify ideal forms of commitment, if it is to avoid 
particularistic emptiness and collapse into light entertainment at best, insignifi­
cant word play at worst.
In fact, both philosophy and literature at their bests have engaged with each 
other to develop forms of attention to human life and to human commitments 
and passions while avoiding both empty idealism and empty particularism. Phi­
losophy has its particular initiating perplexities and its forms of the emplotment 
of the progress of an implied protagonist, including at least dialogues, confessions, 
summas, meditations, essays, treatises, tractates, critiques, phenomenologies, 
manifestoes, postscripts, genealogies, and investigations, among others. Litera­
ture has its forms of appeal to general philosophical terms, as it undertakes to 
treat the particularities with which it engages, however sotto voce, as significant 
instances of some more general idea, concept, or theory of the human; emplot­
ment of the plausible is impossible without some more general concept of the 
probable or necessary. As Asja Szafraniec usefully remarks, “ [Ljiterature does not 
exorcise the universal from itself but negotiates an intersection of the singular 
and universal within itself as a singular work” (2007: 57). Hence, each form of 
attention—philosophy and literature—both negotiates with and resists the other, 
engages with and excludes it.
If we focus abstractly on philosophy’s concern with ideal, general commit­
ments and literature’s attention to particulars as objects of passion, then we might 
develop something like the following table of oppositions:
Philosophy
Universality
Reason
Literature
Particularity
(Particularized) Imagination
Ideal Symbolic Order Primary Process
Detachment
Insight
Engagement
Emotion
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Such an abstract set of oppositions has some point in revealing patterns of mutual 
contestation. But we would do well to remember also that there are, always, engage­
ment and negotiation as well as resistance and repudiation. When we attend to how 
simultaneous engagement and contestation have been played out, we find Socrates, 
Plato, and Aristotle not quite wholly displacing and killing off Homeric epic, Pin­
daric Ode, and Sapphic lyric; the modern novel not quite wholly displacing and 
killing off theological or rationalist philosophy; artistic modernism not quite dis­
placing and killing off more thematized and emplotted philosophy and literature; 
analytical philosophy not quite displacing and killing off literature; mongrelizing 
postmodernism not quite displacing and killing off all of philosophy, traditional 
narrative literature, and more formally unified modernism; and so on.
Both genres and certain central devices of attention (emplotment, character­
ization, style) then emerge more as ways of registering and coming to terms with 
continuing tensions between a standing human need for and possibility of reflec­
tive orientation under reasonable commitments and a standing absence of com­
pleteness of orientation. These tensions are played out within various overlapping 
spheres of life: social-historical (economic, sociological, political), ethical-familial, 
developmental-psychoanalytic, moral, formal-aesthetic, and cognitive-scientific. 
These spheres of life in turn take different historical shapes: the culture of mar­
tial honor of twelfth-century b.c.e. Greece is not the same as the culture of cos­
mopolitan wit in the salons of Berlin circa 1800; the culture of Enlightenment in 
eighteenth-century Edinburgh is not the same as the culture of capitalism and the 
image in contemporary Tokyo or Milan; the culture of the nineteenth-century 
boulevards and arcades in Paris or Vienna is not the same as the cultures of hybrid- 
ity crossed with fundamentalism in contemporary Cairo, Los Angeles, or Tehran. 
Oslo is not Abu Dhabi; Sao Paulo is not Beijing; Mumbai is not Philadelphia; and 
none of these is Peoria or Surbiton or Yoknapatawpha County or Albogastathir 
or Banaras. Yet tensions in life between aspiration supported by reflection and 
the empirically happenstantial remain variously evident, and they are taken up in 
various and illuminating ways by both literature and philosophy.
Philosophy and literature as forms of attention are then modes of seeking ori­
entation and clarification of commitment and emotion, and both begin within a 
specific, situated point of view. Focusing on how each form of attention seeks ori­
entation and clarification within a point of view and from a situation of perplexity, 
R. G. Collingwood argues that they are not, ultimately, distinct:
Ever since Pythagoras (or so we are told) invented the word philosophy, in order 
to express the notion of the philosopher not as one who possesses wisdom but 
as one who aspires to it, students of philosophy have recognized that the essence 
of their business lies not in holding this view or that, but in aiming at some 
view not yet achieved: in the labour and adventure of thinking, not the results 
of it. What a genuine philosopher (as distinct from a teacher of philosophy 
for purposes of examination) tries to express when he writes is the experience 
he enjoys in the course of this adventure, where theories and systems are only 
incidents in the journey. For the poet, there is, perhaps, none of this dynamism
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of thinking. He finds himself equipped, as it were, with certain ideas, and 
expresses the way in which it feels to possess them. Poetry, then, in so far as it 
is the poetry of a thinking man and addressed to a thinking audience, may be 
described as expressing the intellectual emotion attendant upon thinking in 
a certain way: philosophy, the intellectual emotion attendant upon trying to
think better__[But] in so far as each is good, each converges, as regards style
and literary form, with the other; in the limiting case where each was as good as 
it ought to be, the distinction would disappear. (1938: 297, 298)
Collingwood may somewhat overstate his claim: philosophy and literature are 
at least comparatively distinct from one another, in that philosophy foregrounds 
result, impersonality, and attention to general discursive and practical commit­
ment, while literature foregrounds process, personal engagement, particularity, 
and perplexity. Yet philosophy, too, begins in perplexity; and literature, too, seeks 
at least implicit generalizable significance. Both exist in the space of clarification. As 
Kantian critique, Dewey on the reflex arc, and Wittgenstein’s later criticisms of the 
Tractatus myth of simple objects should have taught us, there is no getting beneath 
conceptual commitments and ways of taking objects to identify sempiternal, 
ultimate metaphysical objects, while still retaining a point of view. Point-of-view 
having lacks any fixed, ultimate ground, and it inherently involves discursive tak­
ings that are themselves contestable and freighted with perplexities and emotional 
opacities. (This should cast doubt on any strict and absolute opposition between 
a literal language that records the real and a figurative-expressive language that 
stylizes stance and attitude: representation cannot be absolutely separated from 
stance, attitude, and expression of interest and mood.) Human subjectivity as such 
occupies a position of transcendental homelessness that commits it to the seeking 
of orientation and clarification.' This transcendental homelessness may be sensed 
more sharply in technological modernity and in otherwise fragmented cultures 
than elsewhere, but there is good reason to think that it attaches in some measure 
to the bearing of a point of view as such. In mutual engagement and mutual con­
testation, philosophy and literature as forms of attention arise from within this 
situation of the human subject.
The most critically astute and historically perceptive general philosophical 
account of the roles of literature and poetic imagination in human life remains 
Hegel’s Lectures on Fine Art. Hegel begins by noting that both literature and phi­
losophy address oppositions, between abstract law, legislative reason, duty, and 
civic order, on the one hand, and inclinations, sensuous impulses, and somatic 
responses to an abundance of new phenomena, on the other. These oppositions 
are natural to human life as such; coherent commitments that would resolve these 
oppositions never lie fully ready to hand. In Hegel’s full history of forms of art, it is 
these oppositions that function more effectively as a universal that informs human 
life than does any logic-governed concept of freedom. But while they are univer­
sal, these oppositions also take specific shapes in specific historical circumstances; 
in particular, modernity exacerbates them, as the social division of labor and the 
need to make a life via specialized skill within a market economy increase.
8 PHILOSOPHY AND LITERATURE AS FORMS OF ATTENTION
These are oppositions which have not heen invented at all by the subtlety of 
reflection or the pedantry of philosophy; in numerous forms they have always 
preoccupied and troubled the human consciousness, even if it is modern culture 
that has first worked them out most sharply and driven them up to the peak of 
harshest contradiction. (Hegel 1975,1: 54)
Though they effectively lack any superintending logic (more so than Hegel’s offi­
cial doctrine would allow), these oppositions can nonetheless be addressed and 
worked through partially. One can seek in abstract reflection informed by his­
torical awareness to determine more adequate commitments and practices that 
will moderate these oppositions for many to some degree; general philosophical 
theories of commitments, practices, and institutions can yield some fruits. Or, and 
also at the same time, the work of imagination can recontextualize, emplot, and 
redirect commitments that remain significantly tied to particulars, yielding mod­
est routes of orientation via the exemplary. It can take up, elaborate, and clarify 
initially inchoate but real emotional perplexities and somatic investments as they 
continue to inhabit any form of institutionalized social life.
As Hegel notices, it is poetry that first answers to a standing need for orienta­
tion toward the more fit and satisfying exercise of human powers within opposi­
tions. (“Poetry” [Poesie] is Hegel’s term for all significant imaginative dramatic 
literature, including epic, lyric, tragedy, comedy, romance, the novel, and other 
related genres and subgenres.) “Man exists conformably to the law of his existence 
only when he knows what he is and what his surroundings are: he must know what 
the powers are which drive and direct him, and it is such a knowledge that poetry 
provides in its original and substantive form” (Hegel 1975, 2: 973). First in epic 
and then in further imaginative, dramatic forms, poetry (literature) presents not 
material things as they are and may be discerned via impersonal measurement, in 
themselves, but rather things as they matter to us, for good or ill, in feeling and 
within emplotments of engagements. “The poetic imagination, as the activity of a 
poet, does not, as plastic art does, set before our eyes the thing itself in its external 
reality (even if that reality be produced by art), but gives us on the contrary an 
inner vision and feeling of it” (Hegel 1975, 2: iiii).
The work of poetic or literary presentation is then in general to address and 
work through a structure of feeling that has arisen in relation to the lived expe­
rience of oppositions, as these oppositions circumstantially take on new shapes 
and mobilize somatic investments. Feeling is tested for aptness in relation to its 
occasioning perplexities, subjected to complex modulation and development via 
emplotment of what is or may be going on, and focused. It is transformed from a 
suffered burden deriving from happenstance into an active response of felt engage­
ment, for which both author and reader can then take responsibility, thus making 
the continuing of the life of a subject, always caught up in feeling, more bearable.
[Poetry’s] task, namely, is to liberate the spirit not from but in feeling. The blind 
dominion of passion lies in an unconscious and dull unity between 
itself and the entirety of a heart that cannot rise out of itself into ideas and
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self-expression. Poetry does deliver the heart from this slavery to passion by 
making it see itself, but it does not stop at merely extricating this felt passion 
from its immediate unity with the heart but makes of it an object purified from 
all accidental moods, an object in which the inner life, liberated and with its 
self-consciousness satisfied, reverts freely at the same time into itself and is at 
home with itself. (Hegel 1975,2:1112)
Liberation in feeling is not a matter simply of settling on classifications, normative 
stances, general principles, or policies for future comportment (however impor­
tant the testing of all these may also be). Instead, it involves animation—more 
fully achieved ensoulment—within feeling. As Kant puts it, the work of poetic 
imagination in attending to things is not that of classification alone; rather, it car­
ries out “the addition to a concept of much that is unnameable, the feeling of which 
animates the cognitive faculties and combines spirit with what would otherwise 
be the mere letter of language.”^ Without this animation or ensoulment, involving 
feeling’s response to what is unnameable in experience, but feeling then developed, 
modulated, and brought to poetic expression, human life threatens to be dull, dis­
engaged, dispirited, and evacuated of responsive subjectivity. Or, in Hegel’s devel­
opment of this same point,
[t]he universal and the rational are not expressed in poetry in abstract 
universality ^nd philosophically proved interconnection, or with their aspects 
merely related together as in scientific [wissenschaftlich] thinking, but instead as 
animated, manifest, ensouled, determining the whole, and yet at the same time 
expressed in such a way that the all-comprising unity, the real animating soul, is 
made to work only in secret from within outwards. (1975, 2: 973)
Relating the incidents, scenes, persons, thoughts, moods, and feelings that are 
presented in a literary work of art so as to invite, sustain, and develop emotional 
engagement, animation, and ensoulment is not, then, the presentation of the 
merely materially real either enumeratively or theoretically. “In general we may 
describe poetry’s way of putting things as figurative because it brings before our 
eyes...an appearance such that in it we immediately recognize the essence [or 
what is significant for us within feeling in relation to possibilities of fuller and 
freer life] through, and inseparably from, the external aspect and its individuality” 
(Hegel 1975, 2:1002). Thought, feeling, language, and subject matter remain teth­
ered to one another via figuration, in a sustained act of attention in the furtherance 
of life.
Given that human subjects necessarily exist in material and cultural situa­
tions that are shared at least to some extent, the poetic work of attention and of 
the working through of feeling must not be uniquely individual. It is a criterion of 
success for literary and poetic attention that some resonance with the development 
of the situation in language be achieved with some others. In a thought that Hegel 
shares with Wordsworth and Collingwood, among others, casual and incidental 
rendering, as merely happenstantial, must be distinguished from successful atten­
tion that deploys the powers of a subject in an exemplary and resonant way:
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In order that this [poetic] expression may not remain a merely casual expression 
of an individual’s own immediate feelings and ideas, it becomes the language of 
the poetic inner life, and therefore however intimately the insights and feelings 
which the poet describes as his own belong to him as a single individual, they 
must nevertheless possess a universal validity, i.e. they must be genuine feelings 
and meditations for which the poet invents or finds the adequate and lively 
expression. (1975, 2:1111-12)
How the required exemplarity and resonance are to be achieved remains, however, 
deeply unclear, according to Hegel. Whatever the achievements of modern social 
institutions may be, there remain enough oppositions in life to provoke manifold 
varieties of emotional perplexities and inchoate somatic investments that require 
working through. Hence, “the most heterogeneous works count as poetry” (1975. 
2; 971); there are no rules of taste, no necessary forms of organization or diction, 
no necessary subject matters. Instead, poetic imagination in finding and integrat­
ing appropriate organization, style, and subject, so as to achieve effective working 
through, is all.
Hegel’s own historical account of the rises and falls of distinct forms of social 
life, and so, he argues, of the literary forms appropriate to them, is both exces­
sively, implausibly rigid and yet insightful in its attention to the importance of 
social-material circumstances for the practice of literary art. The excessive and 
implausible rigidity consist in his supposing that forms of social life are more or 
less coherent wholes, not mongrels; that the boundaries between them are more 
or less clear; and that their historical succession is governed by a superintending 
logic. And yet his insights are penetrating, especially in his account of epic. “Epic 
proper,” Hegel argues, is “actualized in the most artistically adequate way [only] 
by the Greeks” (1975, 2:1093)—indeed, only by Homer. This is because a celebra­
tory song of accepted heroic virtues (including accepted virtues in conflict with 
one another), if it is to do the artistic work of working through an emotionally 
freighted point of view that is shared, presupposes a certain social world in which 
these virtues are accepted and common attitudes toward them are held. This is 
possible only under specific material circumstances:
The state of human life most suitable as the background of an epic is that in 
which [a universal ethical ground] exists for individuals already as a present 
reality but which remains most closely connected with them by the tie of a 
common primitive life.... The relations of ethical life, the bond of the family, 
as well as the bond of the people—as an entire nation—in war and peace 
must all have been discovered, framed, and developed; but on the other 
hand, not yet developed into the form of universal institutions, obligations, 
and laws valid in themselves without any ratification by the living subjective 
personality of individuals, and indeed possessed of the power of subsisting 
even against the will of individuals.... [Man] must still feel himself alive 
in... the means for satisfying his needs: e.g. house and garden, tents, seats, 
beds, swords and lances, ships for crossing the sea, chariots to take him to 
battle, kettles and roasting-tins, slaughter of animals, food and drink.. .with 
his whole mind and self, and therefore give a really human, animated, and
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individual stamp to what is inherently external hy bringing it into close 
connection with the human individual. Our modern machines and factories 
with their products, as well as our general way of satisfying the needs of 
our external life, would from this point of view be just as unsuitable as our 
modern political organization is for the social background required for the 
primitive epic. (Hegel 1975, 2:1051-53)
Certain conceptions of human character must further be both commonly 
accepted and worked into the successful epic text. Inwardness and moralism 
must have little place. Counsel and freely willed participation—and only these, 
not statute—hold the Greeks together as a warring body. Hence, Agamemnon’s 
“position as overlord does not become the dry connection of command and obe­
dience, of a master and his servants” (Hegel 1975, 2: 1053), and “Achilles, as an 
epic character, should not be given moral lectures as if he were a schoolboy” 
(1068). Hence, if there are modern epics—Star Wars or The Lord of the Rings or 
The Golden Compass—these must tend strongly toward compensatory escapism 
rather than objective social description, and they will be set in a time long ago 
and far away.
We should not, however, suppose that Homer merely describes actual events. 
The heroic virtues must be developed artistically, presented, for example, through 
extended, predominantly visual similes’ and set within plots in which choices 
about foci of attention must be made:
But we must not put the matter at all as if a people in its heroic age as such, the 
cradle of its epic, already had the skill to be able to describe itself poetically....
The need to make play with ideas in such a presentation, i.e. the development of 
art, necessarily arises later than the life and the spirit which is naively at home 
in its immediate poetic existence. Homer and the poems bearing his name are
centuries later than the Trojan war which counts as an actual fact__[Yet] in
spite of the separation in time, a close connection must nevertheless still be left 
between the poet and his material. The poet must still be wholly absorbed in 
these old circumstances, ways of looking at things, and faith, and all he needs to 
do is to bring a poetic consciousness and artistic portrayal to his subject which 
is in fact the real basis of his actual life. (Hegel 1975, 2:1046-47)
Proper to epic, then, as a form of effective high literary art is “the objective presen­
tation of a self-grounded world,... a world to which the poet’s own way of looking 
at things is akin and with which he can identify himself” (1047); absent such a 
world and wholehearted identification with it, the production of epic as the highest 
form of literary art is impossible.
Yet beyond this singular case, correlations between social and literary forms 
are much looser and for some literary forms largely absent. In particular, lyric, 
unlike epic, “has the advantage of being producible at almost any moment in a 
nation’s history, [and] its contents may be of extreme variety and touch national 
life in every direction” (Hegel 1975,2:1113-14). The task of the lyric poet, as of, later, 
the modern novelist and writer of shorter forms of artistic prose, all of whom live 
amidst greater varieties of individualization, is only
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that he shall entirely assimilate and make his own the objective subject-matter.
For the truly lyrical poet lives in himself, treats circumstances in accordance 
with his own poetic individual outlook, and now, however variously his inner 
life may be fused with the world confronting him and with its situations, 
complexities and fates, what he nevertheless manifests in his portrayal of 
this material is only the inherent and independent life of his feelings and 
meditations. (1118)
A more individualized working through of emotionally freighted point-of-view 
having, with more uncertain reception, is now the norm. Forms multiply, effec­
tively achieved resonances become more distinctly sectarian, and more markedly 
individual style and diction become more foregrounded.
Everywhere, and whether one locates its beginnings in fourteenth-century 
Italy, in seventeenth-century science, or distantly in Hellenic and Roman cos­
mopolitanism, the modern is marked by awareness of difference, contingency, 
variability, and the consequent impossibility of the full consolidation of mean­
ingful culture without significant opacities, disenfranchisements, and perplexi­
ties. Whatever we make of postmodernity—whether it is something genuinely new 
and different or rather a late moment of modernity—these awarenesses become 
yet more prominent. The importance of literature in working through emotions 
initiated by perplexities becomes all the more significant, in contrast with, say, 
theology, as both perplexities and felt awarenesses of them increase. As a result, 
as J. M. Bernstein puts it, “modern works of art are riven with a reflective, critical 
self-consciousness of themselves as works of art in relation to (postulated, pos­
ited, proposed, invented) indeterminate ideals from which they remain forever 
separate” (2006:150). They undertake the work of working through, in the hope 
of achieving the clarification and consolidation of felt interest, while knowing that 
achievements of fullest clarification, consolidation, and resonance remain elusive. 
Experimentalism and the marking of literary style as differing from communica­
tive norms become more prominent, as modes of distinctly literary achievement 
are sought and resought. As new perplexities and consequent emotional burdens 
are brought into attention, the devices of the Freudian primary process (conden­
sation, displacement, considerations of representability, and secondary revision) 
jostle against direct communicative intent, too ready emplotment, cliche, and the 
didactic. Figuration holds open the space of attention to the difficult and emotion­
ally perplexing. Finitude in undertaking to perfect practical and discursive com­
mitments is fully accepted, and the work of literary attending goes on.
And yet address to the perplexing situation of subjects remains possible, even 
in the absence of the achievement of absolute orientation. In a characterization 
that may be taken as well to describe the condition of modern literature as such, 
Gyorgy Lukacs describes “the irony of the novel” as
the self-correction of the world’s fragility: inadequate relations can transform 
themselves into a fanciful yet well-ordered round of misunderstandings and 
cross-purposes, within which everything is seen as many-sided, within which 
things appear as isolated and yet connected, as full of value and yet totally
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devoid of it, as abstract fragments and as concrete, autonomous life, as flowering
and as decaying, as the infliction of suffering and as suffering itself. (1971:75)
Engaging with philosophical general terms, yet denying finality in their applica­
tion, correcting the world’s fragility without denying it, and acknowledging and 
working through perplexities without dismissing them, literature and philosophy 
as imaginative disciplines are forms of attention both to the generalities and to the 
difficult particulars of human life.
Given the partly complementary, partly opposed forms of attention to human 
life that are cultivated in literary and philosophical writing, as they engage with 
and contest one another, it is not clear that philosophy and literature is a distinct 
subfield of philosophy, comparable, say, to ethics, epistemology, or the philosophy 
of science (the subjects of other Oxford Handbooks), nor is it clear that it should be. 
There are numbers of courses with the title “Philosophy and Literature” that are 
taught in many places, but these courses often do not share any specific readings 
or organizational scheme with one another. They are generally determined by the 
interests of a particular instructor, and they generally lie somewhat aslant the main 
curricula in both philosophy and literary studies.
In thinking about the relations of complementarity and opposition between 
philosophy and literature, I have taken the “and” in the title seriously. Specifi­
cally, I have resisted the idea to organize the collection around the philosophy of 
literature, treating topics such as the definition of literature, fictional objects and 
fictional worlds, interpretation, emotions about literature, and so forth, as self­
standing topics in their own right to be submitted to the normal standards for the 
treatment of distinctly philosophical problems. Several other collections already 
exist that usefully collect the most important treatments of these problems. More 
important, however, this style of normal philosophical problem solving tends to 
detract from full attention both to the powers and interest of literature and to the 
uneasy affinities and disaffinities between philosophy and literature as practices. 
It seeks to understand the work of literature too readily against the background of 
protocols of knowing that were developed principally within the epistemology of 
the natural sciences, thus all but inevitably casting literature as secondary, decora­
tive, or deficient.
This collection is also not devoted to philosophy in literature; literary works 
are not to be taken as mere instances of philosophical stances that are more articu­
lately and adequately worked out elsewhere, as one might, for example, take Sar­
tre’s Nausea as an illustration of Being and Nothingness. This approach, too, scants 
both the powers of literature and the engagements and contestations that bind 
philosophy and literature to one another as forms of attention and disciplines of 
culture.
Instead, this collection is organized around considerations of genre, of certain 
large-scale historical changes in dominant forms of sensibility and expression, of 
central devices for developing and sustaining literary attention, and finally, of the 
uses of literature.
14 PHILOSOPHY AND LITERATURE AS FORMS OF ATTENTION
Contributors were invited to explore the interests for human life of specific 
genres of literature, to consider broad modes of attention that have marked off cer­
tain large cultural periods from one another and yet may also be available at many 
times, to trace the workings of certain central devices for achieving attention, and 
to consider literature as a practice in relation to the practices of inquiry, moral­
ity, and politics. As they appeared, the essays developed increasing resonances 
with one another, as an essay on a given period or device charted its course via 
comparisons with a neighboring period or device that was the subject of another 
essay. Various overlapping themes—what words and characters are; how imagina­
tion works; the kinds of significances social circumstances have for imaginative 
literary production; the needs and interests of situated subjects; the distinctive­
ness of artistic presentation; the fact of style; the significances of Aristotle, Hegel, 
Nietzsche, Lukdcs, and Wittgenstein, among others, for thinking about literary 
practice—became increasingly clear and prominent. It has been both a pleasure 
and an education for me to work with the contributors who have taken up the 
invitation to explore philosophy and literature with perceptiveness, subtlety, and 
argumentative cogency that go well beyond what anyone could have hoped for. 
Given the powers of their essays, I am confident in trusting that other readers will 
experience similar tuitions and delights.
NOTES
1. Gyorgy Lukacs introduces the notion of transcendental homelessness in order to 
characterize the situation of the subject in modernity in The Theory of the Novel (1920, 
reprinted 1971: 61). I follow him in thinking of this transcendental homelessness as 
especially marked in modernity, but reject his claim that it was altogether absent among 
the eighth-century b.c.e. Greeks.
2. Kant 2000:194 (p. 316 Akademie edition); translation slightly modified, adding 
“what would otherwise be” for “als bloPetn.”
3. On the artistry of visual witness in Homer, see Auerbach (1953), especially chap. 1, 
“Odysseus’ Scar,” and Ledbetter 2002: chap. 1, “Supernatural Knowledge in Homeric 
Poetics.”
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